ABSTRACT The device-to-device (D2D) channels allow content sharing when two devices are in close proximity, which can help improve resource utilization and network capacity. The data caching is introduced in D2D networks to enable the quick data access in mobile networks. Due to the selfish nature of users, they wish to get as much replication as possible in the opportunistic connections, seeking to maximize their own profits. However, caching data for other nodes may result in additional cost to the node serving as cache, where the cost is invoked by the cache placement of cache nodes and accessing cost of other nodes. In this paper, we propose a social-aware caching game to incentivize nodes to cache data for others. In the game, we consider the social ties and physical distance as the factors to formulate the caching cost. We obtain the Nash equilibrium of the game and propose a social-aware algorithm to minimize the total cost of getting object data in the network. The extensive simulation results show that our algorithm gains significant cache benefit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is one of the technologies which allows direct communication between devices when they are in close proximity [12] , [21] , [23] . By using D2D communication channel, adjacent users can share data content with each other. Due to the D2D communication channel is built directly between two nodes, which does not need the assistance of the cellular towers, it can increase the capability of the network and saving spectrum resources [2] , [14] .
To facilitate content sharing in D2D networks, data caching in selected nodes is now widely used to improve system performance [18] . It can offer a variety of advantages in D2D communications such as reducing the accessing cost. For example, a device can share the video content with nearby devices with similar watching interest. In D2D communication networks, one device chooses to cache the video content locally, and it will lead to memory consumption. If the nearby node choose to get the same video content from the cache node, the accessing cost is positively correlated with the distance between them. Meanwhile, the demand for the object data will also impact the accessing cost. One with higher demand for the object data is willing to pay more than the node with lower demand. Therefore, each node may seek to maximize their own benefit and pay as little as possible. One promising method to reduce the cost of nodes is caching data in a cooperative way [3] , [20] . It selects several nodes cooperatively serving as cache nodes from the network in the distributed manner, and other nodes get the desired data from the cache nodes. Specifically, they measure the relationship among nodes, and choose the cache candidates by the distance among nodes. For instance, Figure 1 shows a cooperative cache scheme based on node relationships. The solid nodes are served as cache and the links between nodes represent their relationships. Each node intends to acquire data from the cache node with closer relationship. However, nodes may behave selfishly because of their selfish nature [9] , [10] , which results in nodes not willing to behave cooperatively. Considering the selfish nature of mobile nodes, incentivizing data cache in D2D networks is still an open issue.
To address the incentivizing data cache issue, we propose a social-aware incentive caching method by two kinds of relationships between nodes: physical and social relationships. The physical distance measures the encounter probability between two nodes. It is obviously that the accessing cost is reduced if one node can get the data item from a nearby device instead of data source in a farther place [12] . Nodes with shorter physical distance have more incentives to cache data for each other. Social ties indicate the social relationship between two nodes. They also play an unprecedented role in people's interactions with others. For example, individuals with close friendship may have similar interests, which means they tend to have similar preference for the same data content. Such friendship may influence the caching method among individuals as physical distance does. Therefore, we construct the cost function for data cache considering both physical and social factors. Then we carry out a social-aware caching game (SACG) to incentivize data caching by minimizing the cost function and obtain the Nash equilibrium solution [1] for the incentive data cache problem in D2D networks. We propose both central and distributed social aware incentive caching algorithm based on the proposed SACG. Finally, we conduct the experiments based on the real data trace, the evaluation results show that our data cache algorithm outperforms other schemes up to 51% in terms of successful ratio of cache hit and meanwhile it incentivizes more than 50% of nodes serving as data caches than that of other schemes.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• To analyze the accessing cost of nodes in the network, we introduce social ties to formulate the cost. We combine social relationship with physical distances to find the optimum strategy.
• We demonstrate a social-aware caching game, and we show Nash equilibrium exists in the game. An incentive method is proposed to minimize the total cost of the network.
• Extensive experiments show that our proposed scheme outperforms other schemes up to 51% in terms of successful ratio of cache hit and meanwhile it incentivizes 50% more data caches than other schemes. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related work. Section III describes the problem in detail. Section IV analyzes the caching game model and shows the existence of Nash equilibrium in our proposed game model. Section V outlines the social-aware incentive caching algorithm. Section VI evaluates the performance of the proposed algorithms. We conclude the work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Many works have focused on D2D caching problem recently [12] . Previous works have studied cooperative caching [13] , [19] , [20] . Wang et al. [19] described a cooperative caching scheme which studies the relationship between nodes and divides buffer space into three components to cache data according to the accessing frequency. Although it takes the social relationship into consideration in the caching problem, only considering the data accessing frequency when making cache strategy is not persuasive enough. Kang et al. [13] proposed an algorithm that minimizes the average caching failure probability. Wei et al. [20] proposed a fairness aware cooperative caching scheme to improve access performance. They all introduced cooperate caching methods to help improve network performance. However, these cooperative methods overlook the selfish nature of nodes, they assume nodes are willing to help others, and no study in D2D cache considers the incentivization of data cache.
There are many researches incentivize cooperation by social aware game theory. Chen et al. [5] exploits social ties to promote efficient cooperation among devices in D2D network. This paper use social ties to promote efficient cooperation among devices. Chen et al. [4] develops a social group utility maximization framework to maximize the social group utility using both physical and social relationship. However, mobile users care about their social group utility, they only behave cooperatively among social group members. To users outside the social group, they behave selfishly. Different from [4] , our paper fully take into account of the selfish nature of mobile users and minimize the overall cost of the network. Some studies also studied the incentive caching in D2D networks [6] , [24] . They built the incentive caching model based on contacts, but no real social relationship is applied. Chen et al. [7] formulated the relay allocation between cellular towers and D2D devices by auction.
One similar study [10] to our work analyzed the cost of cache in distributed network, but no social factors are considered. Wu et al. [22] proposes incentivizing caching for P2P-VoD systems. The incentive decision is made depending on the popularity of the videos. The incentive scheme impacts the peers' caching behaviors and stimulates the peers' contribution, whereas selfish peers would not contribute their own resources by default. Our work differs from them by considering both social and physical relationship, and constructs the social-aware caching game by considering both physical and social relationships.
Our work differs from others by introducing social factors into incentive scheme for data caching. It has advantages in D2D networks as nodes will not only motivated by physical distance but also social relationships for caching. Due to such a reason, more nodes will join for data cache. We will describe the detail of our work in the following sections.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we formulate the data caching problem in D2D networks and demonstrate the basic approach for data caching scheme.
A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
D2D is designed to enable direct communication with the user in a certain range of distance to reduce the load on the service base station. In D2D networks, mobile nodes contact each other opportunistically, which can be described as G(V , E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges among nodes which represents their contacts. Nodes in D2D network can play the role as a sender or recipient. In D2D caching scheme, one node gets the replica from the data source or another cache node within direct communication distance.
In D2D caching networks, costs will be generated during the data accessing process. Each node needs to pay a cost C i for caching data on other nodes. Such costs contains the resource consumption of nodes either when they serve as a cache node or a request node. While choosing its caching strategy, each node cares about its own benefit and behaves selfishly. Additionally, they also care about their social friends and physical contacts. On the one hand, they are willing to cache data for their social friends. On the other hand, two nodes with many physical contacts may serve cache for each other to be reciprocal with each other.
B. BASIC APPROACH
In D2D caching problem, we incentivize data caching by reducing the caching cost incurred by all mobile nodes in the network. We denote minimum cost problem as the following optimization problem:
where n is the amount number of nodes in the network and C i represents the cost incurred by node i.
To stimulate mobile nodes to cache for others in D2D networks to maintain the minimum of cost, we apply a socialaware caching game to solve this problem. In the game, each node is a player and aims to maximize its own benefit. Every player can cache the data by themselves or get the data from other nodes depends on the demand of object data w i and node distance d ij . In D2D networks, the node distance is affected by not only physical proximity but also social relationships. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the upper layer describes the social tie and the lower layer describes the physical relationship. In the figure, the dot lines are social relationships and solid lines are physical relationships. In the physical domain, closer physical distances can help reduce the accessing cost. In the social domain, closer social relationships mean that they are more willing to help cache for each other. Therefore, we take these two aspects into consideration to formulate the distance.
1) PHYSICAL RELATIONSHIP
In D2D networks, only devices within a certain physical distance can transmit data directly. As shown in Figure 2 , in physical domain, we use graph G p (V , E p ) to describe the physical relationship, where V represents the set of nodes and E p is set of reachable physical distances among them. Solid lines show whether two devices are within the communication range. If nodes i and j is connected by a solid line, they are of physical distance that can contact each other and we use E p (i, j) = 1 to indicate this relationship, and E p (i, j) = 0 means node i and j are beyond the communication scope. Each node i ∈ V is a wireless device that is willing to conduct D2D communication to transfer data packets to other nodes. However, if the physical distance is too far, this action may bring more cost for the network during the transmission [8] .
Different from typical mobile networks, a distinctive characteristic of D2D network is that mobile devices are carried and operated by human beings. As a result, mobile users' movements make significant influences on physical relationships, resulting in physical distance changing over time. In contrast, the nodes often encountering each other suggesting closer physical relationships. Therefore, instead of physical distance, we use the probability of contacts to represent their physical relationship. For two nodes i, j ∈ V , their physical relationship is represented as 1 L ij , ranging from 0 to ∞, where encounter probability L ij between node i and j can be described as
where T ij is the time duration of their encounter period and T is the total sample time period. A closer relationship VOLUME 4, 2016 between nodes means less cost while transferring data content.
2) SOCIAL TIE
Considering the selfish nature of nodes, one may not be willing to cache as it will lead to some cost. We introduce social ties as one factor to describe node distance. Such social tie information can be easily obtained from online social networks, such as Facebook. We explain how we exploit social tie to formulate node distance in the following. As shown in Figure 2 in social domain, we use graph G s (V , E s ) to describe the social relationship. Similar to the physical domain, V represents the set of nodes and E s is the social friendship of them. Individuals with strong social strength may have similar interests, which means that they are likely to get interested in the same content, so if they cooperate to help cache data for each other, they may both benefit from this situation.
In our incentive mechanism, we use a social-aware caching scheme. In this scheme, nodes are naturally divided into three groups according to their social relationships to other nodes: self, friends and strangers. Nodes are incentivized to cache data items according to the social relationships, by which nodes with closer friendships are more willing to help for data caching. We use Jaccard similarity [17] to define the social relationship between nodes i and j marked as S ij ∈ [0, 1], where 0 suggests no social relationship and 1 suggests the strongest social relationship. Specifically, we compose S ij by considering social factors such as the similarity of their profiles, interests, common friends and interactions. Formally, we describe S ij as:
where m is the total number of factors that influence S ij , k x is the relative weight of each factor and J x is the Jaccard coefficient of these factors [15] . Its common expression is denoted as:
where P xi and P xj are social factors of node i and node j.
Combining both physical relationships and social ties, the node distance d ij is defined as
Overall, we define the cost function C i for node i similar to [10] as follows:
where α i is the placement cost that occurred by buffering cost in the data source which is related to the size of cache data. w i is the demand that node i requests for the object data. d ij indicates the distance between node i and j, where node j is the counterpart cache node of the data. It is obvious that the accessing cost will be higher if two nodes' distance are further. I i tells whether node i will cache the data, if I i is 1 then it is a cache node and 0 otherwise. Note that if node i serves as cache, it needs to pay for placement cost but does not need to pay for the accessing cost, and vise versa. In particular, for a node i, if the data is cached by itself where I i = 1, it will need a cache placement cost α i ; and if the data is cached by other nodes, for example, by node j, it will need a data accessing cost w j * d ij . This node j is the selected cache node where node i obtain the data from. Mathematically, j is defined as
We use an example to show how our incentive approach impacts the caching strategy as shown in right side of Figure 3 . In the figure, the solid nodes correspond to the cache nodes and other nodes get data item from cache nodes. Slim lines suggest the physical relationship between end users and bold lines indicates the social relationship between end users. As shown in left side of Figure 3 , mobile nodes make caching strategies according to their own preference and behave selfishly. In the selfish caching scheme, nodes are not willing to cache data if the physical distance is too far away from the data source. When one node chooses to cache the data, it will choose the cache node if it costs less than from the data source. It may lead to a situation where there is load imbalance when the selfish caching strategy is not reasonable from a global point of view. As shown in Figure 3 , when we take social relationship into consideration, the caching strategy set differs from the previous one. In this case, we can get the social-aware caching strategy which performs better than the selfish one. Note that every node in the D2D network has the chance to become a cache node if the placement cost is smaller than the data accessing cost for a piece of data, which can be either obtained from the cellular networks or from other nodes by D2D connections. In the following, we explain how the social-aware caching game (SACG) make nodes help each other and improve the system performance in D2D networks.
IV. SOCIAL-AWARE CACHING GAME
The minimum cost caching problem can be viewed as a facility location problem, which has been proved to be a NP-hard problem [11] . In order to solve this problem, we introduce social-aware caching game to incentivize nodes to cache. SACG is a game where each player is social-aware and there are costs for caching among them at the same time. We analyze the Nash equilibrium in SACG and prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in our game model, and finally we find the SACG Nash equilibrium solution.
A. OVERVIEW OF SACG
In the SACG, each node serves as a player. Nodes can cache the data by themselves (I i = 1) or bid for nearby nodes to cache (I i = 0). Their payoff can be influenced by w i and node distance d ij . Each node determines whether to cache the data by the placement cost and data accessing cost.
We prove that the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in the social-aware caching game. Nash equilibrium is a kind of strategy combination, which makes the strategy of each participant to be the best response to the other participants' strategies. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing its strategy while the other players keep unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Overall, an individual can receive no incremental benefit from changing actions, assuming other players remain constant in their strategies.
We define the game G and the payoff function is given by cost function C i (I 1 , . . . , I n ) in Eq. 6, where I i as the action of user i. Nash equilibrium describes that in the game G = {S 1 , . . . , S n : u 1 , . . . u n }, where {u 1 , . . . , u n } indicates n users and {S 1 , . . . , S n } is the strategy set of users. A policy instance can be presented by P k = {s k 1 , . . . , s k n }. Note that s i is a policy rule, which indicates whether it serves as cache or not and which cache it associates with or which nodes associate with it for caching. It differs from I i , which is the action of user i. I i = 1 suggests that node i serves as a cache in node i's policy s i , but I i does not convey that which nodes that node i serves for caching. We call P * = (s * 1 , . . . , s * n ) is a Nash equilibrium of game G, if and only if the cost of P * is always less than that of P k for any k in the policy space. In SACG, nodes make strategies on whether to cache to minimize their costs. A series of strategies P * = (s * 1 , . . . , s * n ) is a Nash equilibrium of SACG if no node can benefit by unilaterally changing its strategy. Therefore this P * is a stable result which is acceptable for all nodes. In the following section we prove the Nash equilibrium exists in the SACG and show its Nash equilibrium solution.
B. SACG NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
As we mentioned above, the solution for our caching problem is to minimize the overall cost of the network. We show that pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the SACG, and then we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in the SACG.
Theorem 1: Nash equilibrium exists in the SACG. Proof: Considering the selfish nature of nodes, each node is trying to minimize its own cost. Suppose V is the initialization node set and N is an empty node set. Pick a node y ∈ V such that w y ≥ w x for all x ∈ V . Mark y as a cache node, and let Z (y) = {Z : d zy w zy ≤ α y , z ∈ V }. Z (y) is the node set where nodes z can access the cache data from node y within cost α y . Then remove y and Z (y) from V , let V c = V c y and N = N Z (y). Repeat the process until V is empty. Then clear all the Z , and find the cheapest link for nodes in N .
Nodes in V c are all cache nodes. For any two nodes in V c , which can be marked h and l, we have w h d hl ≤ α h and w l d hl ≤ α l . It means none can benefit from changing its role to a non-cache node because that will lead to a cost which is beyond the placement cost. Therefore, they have no incentive to deviate. On the other hand, nodes in N are the non-cached nodes which choose to get the cache data from others. For these nodes, they have already chosen the cheapest ways to access the cache data whose cost are less than the placement cost. Once a node changes its strategy to cache data, it will lead to higher cost comparing to the previous one. Since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Therefore, this solution is the optimum configuration and Nash equilibrium exists in this configuration.
V. SOCIAL-AWARE INCENTIVE CACHING ALGORITHM
As SACG exists Nash equilibrium and it has Nash equilibrium solution, we show the process of reaching Nash equilibrium in Algorithm 1, which composes the socialaware incentive cache scheme. In the algorithm, it firstly selects the cache nodes with the biggest demand for object data according to their selfish nature. Then it determines the cache node by comparing the data accessing cost with the placement cost. If a node has a lower placement cost than the data accessing cost, the node will select itself as the cache node. Otherwise, it will find the node with lower data accessing cost as the cache node. Finally, it updates the cache strategies for all the nodes and minimize their accessing cost.
We briefly analyze the complexity of Algorithm 1. In each loop, there are at most n iterations. In each iteration, there are n times of computation. Therefore, the algorithm complexity is n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 1, 0, respectively. Therefore, the algorithm complexity is at most O( (n−1)n 2 ) in the first loop. In the last two loops, for there are VOLUME 4, 2016 Algorithm 1 Social-Aware Incentive Caching Algorithm Require: 1: The caching cost of the object data α 2: The demand of node i ∈ V for the object w i 3: The distance between node i and j is d ij 4: There are n nodes in the network.
Ensure:
5: Remove all nodes with zero demand from V . 6: while V !=∅ do 7: pick a node y ∈ V such that w y ≥ w x for all x ∈ V 8:
mark y as a cache node and then remove y and all Z from V 10: let V c = V c y 11: let N = N Z (y) 12: end while 13: for each node m in V c do 14: Z (m) = ∅ 15: end for 16: for each node i in N do 17 :
Z (j) = Z (j) i 19: end for n nodes in the network, the algorithm complexity is no more than n. Overall, the complexity of the algorithm is at most O(
2 ). The output of the proposed algorithm reaches Nash equilibrium and no user will deviate. For any cache node i, its placement cost is α i . If i changes its strategy to be a non-cache node and gets the replica from node j, according to Algorithm 1, we have d ij * min{w i , w j } > α. If node i changes its strategy, the cost of node i will be w i * d ij , which is higher than the placement cost α. Therefore, no cache node will deviate and Algorithm 1 reaches Nash equilibrium.
As D2D networks are mobile and distributed, we also propose a distributed version of social-aware incentive cache scheme. During the initialization process, each node i exchanges the encounter information to calculate the node distance. Then it sets up a timer with initial value β i = α i w i . The timer counts down in every time slot. When the timer reaches 0, it claims itself as a cache node. Then it broadcasts to the network. When a node receive the broadcast message, it compares the placement cost α j with the data accessing cost w j d ij , if α j > w j d ij , it will consider node i as the cache node. Otherwise, it will choose itself as the cache node. The process iterates until all the timers for all nodes are counted. The distributed algorithm suggests that for every node j in D2D networks is eligible to be a cache node if the placement cost α j is smaller than w j d ij .
VI. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed social-aware incentive caching scheme based on real trace. We also compare the proposed caching scheme with other schemes.
A. SIMULATION SETUP
We evaluate the performance of our caching scheme using SIGCOMM 2009 trace [16] . This data set contains 76 participants tracesets of MobiClique application at SIGCOMM 2009 conference in Barcelona, Spain (from August 17th to August 21st, 2009). The data set contains traces of Bluetooth device proximity, opportunistic message creation and dissemination, and the Facebook social network of the participants, including social profiles, social friends and interests.
In this data set, each device performs a periodic Bluetooth device discovery every 120 seconds, which means the contact duration is in a unit of 120 seconds. Upon discovering new contacts, the devices form a RFCOMM link on a pre-configured channel for data communications. Both the Bluetooth name query and service discovery are disabled. Therefore, the network in the data set can be considered as a D2D network.
The data set contains participants, interests, friends, proximity and messages lists. Specifically, it contains the user IDs of 76 participants, and their social profiles including home city, country and affiliation. Besides, a list of interest groups of participants are also included in the dataset. It reveals over 700 of Facebook interest groups of participants in the data set. Moreover, the social friendships of the participants which are discovered on Facebook are also included in the dataset. Finally, as a D2D network, a list of proximities are included in the data set to show the encountered mobile node list over different time periods. In the data set, each node is allowed to send unicast and broadcast messages between friends or among members of interest groups. During the data set collection period, 18, 227 messages are recorded.
We use these participants social profiles, interests, social friends and message lists to construct the social relationships among different users. Then the physical relationship is described by the encounter time duration and encounter times. To enable the simulation of the SACG, the demands for object data item of each node w i are set to follow Poisson distribution.
In the experiment, we compare our proposed social-aware incentive cache with three different caching schemes in D2D communications to show the efficiency and effectiveness of our caching scheme. Specifically, we compare the following four caching schemes:
Random Cache: In this caching scheme nodes cache data items randomly and then other nodes choose to get the replica from the nearest cache node or from the data source. In this caching scheme, only the cache nodes choose their strategies randomly. The other nodes behaves selfishly and care about their own benefit.
Selfish Cache: In this caching scheme nodes behave selfishly and ignore their friendship. Nodes behave selfishly and only consider whether to cache the objective or access it from the nearest node who replicates it, the decision depends on which way is cheaper. We firstly choose the node with the maximum demand and set it as a cache node, then some nodes in the network will choose to get the object data from this cache node. We remove these nodes who already decide their strategies and repeat the first step till the node set is empty. Then strategy set is finalized.
Incentive Cache: In this caching scheme nodes cache data items in an incentive way but they only consider the physical relationship among nodes. In this caching scheme, we start with a random configuration and let this configuration evolves as each node alters its strategy and attempts to minimize its cost.
Social-Aware Incentive Cache: As shown in Algorithm 1, our proposed caching scheme combines both social-aware and incentive caching.
In this paper, we use the following metrics to evaluate the performance of four caching schemes:
• Total cost: The total cost of all nodes in the D2D communiciation network.
• Successful ratio: The ratio of queries being satisfied with the requested data item within the deadline.
• Cache numbers: The number of cache nodes in the network.
• Average delay: The average delay of data request that do not meet the cache node.
• Iteration times: The number of iterations during the experiment.
B. EVALUATION RESULTS
We use Matlab to run the simulation. Each simulation is run by 100 times and we take the average value as the simulation results for the convergence. 
1) IMPACT OF PLACEMENT COST
We evaluate the total cost of the D2D network and the number of caches in the network as a function of placement cost, as shown in Figure 4 . In the evaluation, the placement cost α for different nodes are considered the same in each round of simulations. We varies the placement cost from 0 to 10 to see its impact. The result of total cost is shown in Figure 4a . It presents that the total cost increases as the increase of placement cost. The total cost of our proposed caching scheme is lower than that of other three schemes. The cost of random cache changes very instable when α changes. Selfish cache and incentive cache both can help reduce the network cost but not as good as our scheme. In particular, our scheme reduces 36%, 47%, and 71% cost comparing to incentive cache, selfish cache, and random cache respectively when α is 10. Figure 4b shows the number of caches incentivized for data caching in D2D networks. It presents that all the demand nodes cache the data when α is 0, and decreases sharply as α starts to increase. As the α is increasing, the expensive placement cost makes nodes with little demand or little incentive give up serve as servers and they choose to incentive others to cache. For all caching schemes, cache numbers become stable as α increases to 6. Compared with incentive cache and selfish cache, our proposed social-aware incentive cache scheme stimulates more than 50% of cache nodes for data caching.
2) SUCCESSFUL RATIO AND DELAY
The successful ratio that the nodes hit the data from cache and the average delay in a time duration of 2 hours are shown in Figure 5 . In this group of evaluation, the placement cost α is set to 10. Figure 5a presents the successful ratio of cache hit. It shows that the successful ratio increases as time. Besides, it also shows that the proposed social-aware incentive caching scheme has better performance during the first one hour comparing to others. The proposed scheme enhances the successful ratio by 6%, 8%, and 51% compared to incentive cache, selfish cache, and random cache when the time is 0.5 hours and it keeps such trend until 1.5 hours, and then the successful ratio of the proposed scheme, incentive cache and selfish cache tend to be 100% as the time are long enough for mobile nodes to find the cache nodes in different kinds of cache schemes.
The average delay of data requests which do not meet the data cache is shown in Figure 5b . It presents that before 0.5 hours, the average delays of different caching schemes increase, which they decrease afterwards. The avereage delay of our proposed scheme outperforms that of other schemes. In the sharpest time around 0.5 hours, our proposed scheme outperforms the random caching scheme by 250%. The shorter average delay of the proposed scheme suggests that it reduces the access delay of the whole D2D network. 
3) IMPACT OF ITERATIONS
We finally evaluate the impact of iterations for selfish caching, incentive caching and our proposed social-aware incentive caching with respect to the number of iterations of different caching schemes and the total cost variation after different number of iterations. The evaluation results are shown in Figure 6 .
The number of iterations of different caching schemes as a function of placement cost is shown in Figure 6a . It presents that the number of iterations decreases as the increase of the placement cost. Our proposed scheme needs only 8 iterations when placement cost is 0.5, and this number decreases to 5 iterations when the placement cost is 10. In contrast, other caching schemes need more iterations. In particular, incentive caching scheme needs 3 more iterations while selfish caching schemes need 4 more iterations for different values of placement cost. Overall, the evaluation results show that the proposed scheme needs less number of iterations for Nash Equilibrium.
We also measure total cost variation as a function of the number of iterations when the placement cost is 2. The evaluation result is shown in Figure 6b . It presents that our proposed scheme needs 7 iterations, incentive caching scheme needs 8 iterations while selfish caching scheme needs 10 iterations. Furthermore, it also shows that the total cost of the network decreases after each iteration. For each iteration, our proposed scheme has less total cost than both incentive caching scheme and selfish caching scheme.
C. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION
Overall, we have evaluated our caching scheme with other three caching schemes to show the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme. The results show that our proposed caching scheme can reduce the total cost and average delay, improve the successful ratio and stimulate nodes to help cache comparing with others. The outcome including iteration times and iteration cost also indicates that our proposed caching scheme performs better than other schemes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated incentive caching problem by introducing social-aware caching game. We formulated the cost function by introducing social factors due to the selfish nature of mobile nodes, which results in that they serve cache relies on not only the physical distance but also the social relationships. We analyzed node relationships in both physical and social domain to determine the node distance in D2D networks. To incentivize node for caching, we introduced cost function for nodes. We showed that the problem is a social aware caching game. It has pure strategy Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium has the solutions. We proposed a social-aware caching scheme by taking social relationships into account. The simulation results show that our proposed caching scheme increases the successful ratio of cache hit and meanwhile reduce the total cost of the D2D networks. 
